Autori:
Delbufalo, Emanuela,
Monsurrò, MarinaTitolo:
Asymmetric information in subcontracting decisions: the effects of the first mover advantage Periodico:
SinergieAnno:
2019 - Volume:
37 - Fascicolo:
110 - Pagina iniziale:
87 - Pagina finale:
107Purpose of the paper: The article analyses, in an adverse selection set-up, the effects of the first mover advantage in subcontracting decision between a manufacturer and a supplier in the situation of asymmetric information.
Methodology: The study proposes a game theory model to analyze a supply chain consisting of a single risk-neutral supplier and a single risk-neutral manufacturer facing a contract definition problem.
Results: The model suggests the strategies to obtain a more convenient arrangement for the manufacturer both in screening and signaling framework.
Research limitations: The empirical examination with real-life data needs to be expanded and performed in a cross-sector context.
Practical implications: The model helps the manufacturer in designing the appropriate arrangement for subcontracting relations and extracting hidden information from the suppliers.
Originality of the paper: Our approach provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the effects of the first mover advantage in manufacturer-supplier relationships.
SICI: 0393-5108(2019)37:110<87:AIISDT>2.0.ZU;2-P
Testo completo:
https://ojs.sijm.it/index.php/sinergie/article/view/762/262Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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